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1 
A BETTER MADDEN FIX: HOLISTIC REFORM, NOT BAND-AIDS, 
TO MODERNIZE BANKING LAW 
Matthew J. Razzano* 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, state usury laws prohibited lending above certain 
interest rates, but in 1978 the Supreme Court interpreted the 
National Bank Act (NBA) to allow chartered banks to issue loans at 
rates based on where they were headquartered rather than where the 
loan originated.1 States like South Dakota virtually eliminated 
interest rate ceilings to attract business, incentivizing national banks 
to base credit operations there and avoid local usury laws.2 In 2015, 
however, the Second Circuit decided Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC 
and reversed long-standing banking practices, ruling that non-
chartered financial institutions were not covered by the NBA and 
were therefore subject to state usury laws where the loan originated.3 
The underlying reasoning for the court’s decision was well-
intentioned and based on (a) an unwillingness to allow non-chartered 
institutions to function as pseudo-banks4 and (b) a desire to protect 
consumers.5 The court’s radical decision received widespread 
criticism,6 and empirical studies have demonstrated a noteworthy 
decrease in credit availability in the Second Circuit7—negating the 
court’s own policy rationales. Since Madden, Congress and federal 
agencies have attempted an outright reversal, but none of their 
solutions address the Madden court’s fundamental concerns. This 
 
 *  Law Clerk, J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2019; M.Sc., London School of Economics, 
2016; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2012. 
 1. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) 
(holding that the National Bank Act preempted state usury laws, which allowed interest rates 
to be based on the state where the bank was headquartered and not where the loans were 
issued); see also Sean H. Vanatta, Citibank, Credit Cards, and the Local Politics of National 




 2. See Vanatta, supra note 1, at 72–77.  
 3. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015). 
4. Id. at 251–52. 
5. Id. at 250–51.  
6.       See, e.g., Raj Date, Madden Ruling was a Step Backward. Congress Should Fix It, Am. 
Banker (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/madden-ruling-was-a-
step-backward-congress-should-fix-it; Peter Rudegeair & Telis Demos, LendingClub to Change 
its Fee Model, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-growing-lending-
club-to-change-its-fee-model-1456488393. 
 7. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Can Fintech Increase Lending? How Courts are Undermining 
Financial Inclusion, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research 
/can-fintech-increase-lending-how-courts-are-undermining-financial-inclusion/ 
(summarizing the primary critiques of the Madden decision and discussing two empirical 
studies about the case’s impact on credit availability in the Second Circuit). 
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Essay argues that a Madden fix is needed, but the most effective 
solution must incorporate and address the Second Circuit’s 
underlying concerns. 
I. ATTEMPTED MADDEN FIXES AND THEIR FAILURES 
Before Madden, large banks strategically shifted lending risk by 
securitizing and selling high-risk loans to third-party financial 
institutions. The Madden decision hindered this tactic by subjecting 
these non-chartered financial institutions to usury laws of the state 
where the loan originated, as opposed to the lender’s headquarter 
state.8 The non-headquarter state usury laws tend to have lower 
interest rate caps, making securitization and lending by non-
chartered financial institutions less profitable. Without this strategic 
business option, these institutions had less incentive to lend. In 
Madden’s immediate aftermath, empirical studies demonstrated 
decreased lending rates in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. 
Legal scholar Colleen Honigsberg and others took data from three 
large lending platforms and found that post-Madden, creditors 
started offering “less credit to borrowers . . . . Not only did lenders 
make smaller loans in these states post-Madden, but they also 
declined to issue loans to the higher-risk borrowers most likely to 
borrow above usury rates.”9 Meanwhile, lending “increased after 
Madden outside the Second Circuit,” further illustrating the impact of 
the decision.10 These findings conform with basic economic 
assumptions. A study conducted by economists showed similar 
results: “Consistent with classical price theory, the interest rate 
controls imposed by Madden result in credit rationing. Lending Club 
and Prosper, the two largest U.S. marketplace lenders, significantly 
reduce[d] lending in [Connecticut and New York] . . . . by 10% and 
13.4% respectively.”11 
 
After Madden, various interest groups sought to reverse the 
Second Circuit’s decision. Several government actors and institutions 
attempted to overturn it, or at least temper its effects. Representative 
Patrick McHenry (R-NC) introduced the Protecting Consumers’ 
Access to Credit Act of 2016, which would amend the National Bank 
 
8.       See, e.g., DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4461, MARKETPLACE LENDING: FINTECH 
IN CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf 
(describing the marketplace lending business and how Madden has impacted it). 
 9. Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON. 673, 674–75 (2017). 
 10. Id. at 694. 
 11. Piotr Danisewicz & Ilaf Elard, The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace 
Lending and Personal Bankruptcy 4 (July 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208908. 
SUMMER 2020] A Better Madden Fix 3 
 
Act to make loans originating from chartered financial institutions 
valid when made, regardless of whether the loan was subsequently 
transferred or sold.12 Having made little headway, Representative 
McHenry reintroduced the bill in 2017 with bipartisan signatories,13 
and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA) simultaneously introduced it in the 
Senate.14 These legislative efforts, however, were nothing more than 
single-page reversals of Madden without considering the Madden 
court’s underlying policy concerns. Neither of these bills made 
significant progress in Congress.15 
 
Given Congress’s difficulties addressing the problem through 
legislative action, banking regulators attempted to leverage their 
rulemaking powers to blunt Madden’s impact. First, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the principal banking regulator 
under the NBA16 and agency responsible for issuing bank charters,17 
explored granting special purpose charters for FinTech firms.18 
FinTech firms are not normally covered by the NBA.19 These special 
purpose charters offered protection from state usury laws that cap 
interest rates.20 
 
The FinTech charters quickly faced legal roadblocks, and the 
Southern District of New York questioned the OCC’s authority to 
grant the charters to FinTech firms in the first place.21 The NBA allows 
the OCC to grant charters to institutions in the “business of 
banking.”22 The OCC defines special purpose charter “businesses” as 
including “at least one of the following three core banking functions: 
Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending money.”23 The Southern 
 
 12. Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2016, H.R. 5724, 114th Cong. (2016) (“A 
loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest in accordance with this section 
shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the loan is subsequently sold, 
assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party.’’). 
 13. See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, H.R. 3299, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 14. See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, S. 1642, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 15. While the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act made its way through the House 
and was introduced in the Senate, the Senate has taken no action. Given the subsequent OCC 
and FDIC rules, it is unlikely that Congress will reintroduce these bills.  
 16. See 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 17. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2017). 
 18. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK 
CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 4 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-
innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf [hereinafter 
OCC FINTECH CHARTER REPORT]. “FinTech” refers to firms that aim to solve financial services 
problems through technological solutions. 
19.       See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019), judgment entered sub nom. Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, [insert 
docket number], 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182934 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019).  
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1982). 
 23. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2017).  
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District of New York disagreed with this definition. In Vullo v. Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the court provided three reasons for 
narrowing the definition to deposit activities alone.24 First, it 
interpreted Civil War-era dictionaries to determine what “business of 
banking” meant in the 1860s when the NBA passed.25 Most definitions 
suggested that “banking” requires deposit-taking activities—
something absent from the typical FinTech firm model.26 Next, the 
court noted that the OCC had never before issued non-depository 
charters absent a congressional amendment to the NBA.27 Lastly, it 
found that as part of the broader banking regulatory scheme, national 
institutions in the “business of banking” (a) join the Federal Reserve 
System (“the Fed” or “the System”) through the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act and (b) only acquire competitor banks in accordance 
with the Bank Holding Company Act—both of which define banks as 
“deposit-receiving” entities.28 The Vullo decision suggests that the 
Second Circuit is resolute in closing off any regulatory loopholes left 
by Madden. 
 
Second, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
proposed a rule to reinforce the valid when made doctrine.29 The 
proposed rule cites federal law that “authorizes State banks to charge 
interest at the maximum rate permitted to any State-chartered or 
licensed lending institution in the State where the bank is located.”30 
The proposed rule claims that the “power to make loans implicitly 
carries with it the power to assign loans, and thus, a State bank’s 
statutory authority . . . to make loans at particular rates necessarily 
includes the power to assign the loans at those rates.”31 The OCC 
simultaneously proposed a companion rule, which stated that 
“interest on a loan that is permissible under [the NBA] shall not be 
affected by the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.”32 The 
OCC rule was adopted in June 2020 and is scheduled to go into effect 
in August 2020.33 The new regulation will provide helpful guidance,34 
 
24.       See Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 292–98.  
 25. Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 293–94. 
26.       See id. at 294. 
 27. Id. at 295.  
 28. Id. at 296–97.  
 29. Federal Interest Rate Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,845 (proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331). 
 30. Id. at 66,845. 
 31. Id. at 66,848. 
 32. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 84 
Fed. Reg. 64,229, 64,231 (proposed Nov. 21, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).  
33.     Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 160). In adopting this rule, the 
OCC noted that “it intends that its rule will function in the same way as the FDIC’s proposed 
regulatory text would [in its December 6, 2019 proposed rule].” Id. at 33,535.  
 34. See  Randall D. Guynn et al., Federal Banking Regulators Can and Should Resolve Madden 
and True Lender Developments, DAVIS POLK (Aug. 14, 2018), 
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but the interaction between this rule and the Madden decision 
remains to be seen. The result may be a dual-governance banking 
system, with the Second Circuit attempting to accommodate both 
Madden and the new rule while others maintain traditional NBA 
preemption. Considering that most financial services firms maintain 
some presence in New York,35 the consequences of the Second 
Circuit’s decision have outsized effects. This might prompt the Second 
Circuit to reevaluate Madden, but given the Supreme Court’s recent 
denial of certiorari, it is unlikely that the Second Circuit will reverse 
course on the specific issues presented in Madden in the near future.36   
II. ADDRESSING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CONCERNS 
The solutions above focus on (a) increasing lending in the circuit 
and (b) decreasing the regulatory burden on financial institutions. 
None of the proposed Madden fixes thus far, however, address the 
Second Circuit’s underlying concerns about non-chartered entities 
operating outside of the NBA and the court’s desire to protect 
consumers. A proper Madden fix should not simply return the 
financial system to its status quo, but rather take head-on the issues 
prompting the court’s decision in the first place. 
A.  Fixing Non-Charter Involvement 
Before Madden, the banking industry operated under the 
assumption that 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 gave the OCC authority to determine 
which financial institutions received charters under the NBA.37 The 
Madden and Vullo decisions challenged that assumption. Madden’s 
primary concern was that lax exceptions to the NBA would result in 
non-chartered financial firms operating without the proper 
regulatory backstop.38 The court recognized that precedent had 
granted affiliated firms and subsidiaries NBA coverage, though “[i]n 
most cases in which NBA preemption has been applied to a non-
national bank entity, the entity has exercised the powers of a national 




 35. See California’s Fintech Startups Are Invading New York, AM. BANKER (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/articles/californias-fintech-startups-are-invading-new-
york. 
 36. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2505 (2016). 
37.        See, e.g., Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 278–80 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019). 
 38. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251–52. 
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national bank’s business.”39 In Madden, however, the third-party debt 
purchasers were independent. Passing along NBA protection in that 
instance “would create an end-run around usury laws for non-
national bank entities that are not acting on behalf of a national 
bank.”40 In Vullo, the court was similarly concerned about FinTech 
firms acting as non-traditional banks. The court set aside the OCC’s 
interpretation of “business of banking” and struck down the FinTech 
special charters.41 These decisions make clear that the OCC’s 
authority to grant special purpose charters is more limited than 
previously understood—at least according to the Second Circuit.    
 
The Second Circuit in Madden was reacting in part to the growing 
complexities of Wall Street. Traditional brick and mortar banks are 
not the only institutions in the “business of banking” today.42 FinTech 
firms are taking novel approaches to financial services and operating 
on the margins of a regulatory system designed for traditional 
banks.43 Moreover, the “business of banking” itself has become more 
complicated, as loans are no longer quaint lender-to-borrower 
relationships that last for thirty years.44 Instead, loans are repackaged 
and securitized to such an extent that it becomes nearly impossible to 
determine who actually holds a loan.45 Congress formed several 
agencies to monitor these developments, but the resulting web of 
institutions only provided piecemeal oversight and could not 
comprehensively address the system’s nuances.46 Dodd-Frank’s 
Financial Stability Oversight Council was an effort to bring these 
agencies together to solve systemic risks, but the pre-existing 
relationships between these different bodies has resulted in turf wars 
and regulatory overlap.47 In addition to Washington watchdogs, state 
 
 39. Id. at 251. 
 40. Id. at 252. 
41.       See Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 293–94. 
 42. See generally MIKLOS DIETZ ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., FINTECHNICOLOR: THE NEW PICTURE IN 
FINANCE (2016) (describing how FinTech firms have disrupted the traditional banking model). 
 43. See generally William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1167 
(2018) (explaining that the rise of FinTech firms calls for a reconceptualization of financial 
regulation). 
 44. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 38–51 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf (describing the growth of structured finance securities and 
derivatives). 
 45. See id.  
 46. See Larry D. Wall, Large, Complex Financial Regulation, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Aug. 
2015), https://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/1508.aspx. 
 47. See, e.g., Gregg Gelzinis, Strengthening the Regulation and Oversight of Shadow Banks, 
CTR. AM. PROGRESS (July 18, 2019, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/18/471564/. 
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regulators wield significant authority over the banking industry.48 
National banks might be able to navigate this multifaceted regulatory 
environment, but smaller firms and FinTech companies struggle to 
pay such high regulatory costs.49 
 
Considering these challenges, it is time for lawmakers to rethink 
the bank charter regime. The agency rulemaking process provides 
greater flexibility to adapt to the rapidly-changing financial industry 
landscape, but agency authority is confined by the parameters of their 
statutory mandate(s).50  Vullo exemplified this, exposing gaps in the 
OCC’s charter process since not all financial services companies are 
in the traditional “business of banking.” Today there are charters for 
national banks, state banks, savings associations, and non-bank credit 
unions, among others.51 The OCC’s special purpose charters 
attempted to bring non-traditional institutions into this banking 
community but was unsuccessful. If the OCC continues issuing these 
special purpose charters,52 they run the risk of additional judicial 
intervention, burdening firms with prolonged, costly litigation. At 
some point, new legal authority becomes necessary to remedy this 
issue. 
 
What the OCC attempted to achieve with the special purpose 
charters represents one avenue of reform. Congress could bolster 
these efforts by expanding the types of charters available to financial 
services institutions.53 This would enhance clarity and increase 
diversity in regulation, continuing to afford large national banks 
every protection under the NBA while offering a limited version to 
smaller non-traditional banks. This lawmaking process would take 
place publicly, instead of in bureaucratic backrooms. Despite these 
advantages, the full legislative process would open the door to 
additional interest group involvement. Furthermore, an increase in 




 48. See Jay B. Sykes, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45726, FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN THE DUAL 
BANKING SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS (May 17, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45726.pdf. 
 49. Cf. Abhishek Srivastav et al., Is There a Benefit from Reduced Regulation on Small 
Banks? (May 17, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3389946) (articulating concerns about 
the cost of a strict regulatory framework on small banks). 
 50. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003 (2015) 
(discussing the predominance of agencies in the legislative process).  
51.      See Robert Klinger, 2019 Banking Landscape—Charter Types, JD SUPRA (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2019-banking-landscape-charter-types-62914/. 
 52. OCC FINTECH CHARTER REPORT, supra note 18. 
 53. See Klinger, supra note 51. 
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Alternatively, Congress could address non-charter involvement 
by amending the NBA to place more expansive guardrails around the 
OCC charter issuance process. This could take the form of specific 
rules and limitations regarding the types of institutions under the 
OCC’s control—in essence codifying a lengthier version of 12 C.F.R. 
§ 5.20. Congress could also amend the NBA to better define what the 
“business of banking” means today, pushing back on the narrow 
definition announced in Vullo. Creating a straightforward definition 
would help the OCC determine which organizations ought to receive 
charters and NBA preemption and which organizations fall outside 
the NBA’s scope of banking regulation. Redefining the “business of 
banking,” however, would provide only a temporary fix. The same 
problems with today’s definition would likely reappear in the next 
twenty years as the financial industry continues to evolve.54 A specific 
definition would require periodic, if not constant, revision. 
 
These and other legislative options certainly exist and could 
provide much-needed clarity. Reforming the preexisting charter 
system framework, however,  is only a band-aid to the deeper 
systemic issues at the heart of the Madden decision. To address 
Madden’s concerns, rebuilding the charter system from scratch 
through congressional action is the best method to avoid constant 
litigation and uncertainty.  
B.  Building Consumer Protections 
Madden’s other primary concern was ensuring that states 
maintain the authority to protect consumers. Though Madden makes 
no explicit mention of consumer protection, it implied that 
institutions not bound by the NBA might exploit consumers and 
engage in questionable lending practices with little oversight.55 The 
court feared that non-chartered lenders, free of the state regulatory 
constraints, would prey on vulnerable consumers through payday 
lending and alternative financial solutions.56 Thus, any solution 
aimed at addressing the Madden decision should also consider the 
court’s consumer protection concerns. 
 
 
 54. See Sam Stewart et al., Retail Banking Distribution 2025: Up Close and Personal, BOS. 
CONSULTING GRP. (Sept. 26, 2019), https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Retail-Banking-
Distribution-2025-Up-Close-and-Personal-September-2019_tcm9-230136.pdf. 
 55. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 56. Id. at 251 (discussing the ability of third parties to avoid federal banking law); Cf. GARY 
RIVLIN, BROKE USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG 
BUSINESS (2010) (examining the impact of certain lending institutions on the poor). 
SUMMER 2020] A Better Madden Fix 9 
 
Consumer protection laws for the modern financial system first 
appeared in the mid-twentieth century. The Truth in Lending Act of 
1968 (TILA) helped consumers understand the costs of credit, 
especially with the implementation of a standardized annual 
percentage rate to ensure consumers are provided with consistent 
figures.57 Regulation Z, a Federal Reserve rule implementing TILA, 
requires certain disclosures that provide consumers with a clear and 
consistent picture of the financial commitment they are about to 
make before signing a loan contract.58 Unfortunately, these 
protections have not prevented predatory lending, and lenders have 
found multiple ways to take advantage of consumers.59 The Financial 
Crisis of 2008 was in part driven by these incomplete consumer 
protections, as widespread loan transfers and securitization 
incentivized financial institutions to churn out more loans and bring 
more consumers into the borrowing pool.60 
 
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act 
of 2009 (CARD Act) improved credit card rate clarity, but it did not 
solve all problems.61 In 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) found that questionable lending practices still existed 
and card policies still confused many customers.62 Specifically, the 
CFPB stated that the CARD Act did not address deferred-interest 
products that promise no-interest financing if quickly paid in full and 
trigger exorbitant rates if that date is missed.63 Moreover, the CFPB 
found that credit card companies incentivize customers to join 
rewards programs with obscure terms, requiring customers to accept 
agreements that are up to 8,000 words long.64 The CFPB has reported 
problems with other loan providers as well. For instance, it found that 
student loan services often did not “provide the basic level of service 
 
 57. See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). 
 58. See Compliance Guide to Small Entities: Regulation Z, FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/regzcg.htm (last updated Sept. 11, 2019); see 
also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2020). 
 59.  See generally LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS 
SURVIVES (2017) (describing certain predatory lending practices that detrimentally impact 
consumers). 
 60. See generally Victoria V. Corder, When Securitization Complicates the Issue: What Are 
the Homeowner’s Defenses to Foreclosure?, 16 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 299 (2009) 
(expounding upon the loan securitization and transfer practices of banks during the 2008 
financial crisis). 
 61. See Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2010). 
 62. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT 76–84 (2013), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf [hereinafter CFPB 
REPORT]. 
 63. Id.; see also Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Finds CARD Act 
Helped Consumers Avoid More than $16 Billion in Gotcha Credit Card Fees (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-finds-card-act-helped-
consumers-avoid-more-than-16-billion-in-gotcha-credit-card-fees/. 
 64. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 62, at 62–84. 
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necessary to meet borrowers’ needs,” did not provide the proper 
paperwork, and did not offer “affordable repayment options.”65 
 
Against this backdrop, the Madden court attempted to reign in 
non-traditional, non-chartered lenders by subjecting them to the 
usury laws of the state where the loan originated. Despite the court’s 
good intentions, this decision prompted non-traditional lenders to 
leave the jurisdiction, limiting the banking market and thus limiting 
credit availability to consumers within the circuit.66 Ironically, the 
court’s consumer protection concerns were upended by their own 
decision. A spate of consumer protection proposals exist that other 
articles and books discuss in far greater detail.67 These proposals 
advance fundamental themes that bear repeating. First, any solution 
should standardize interest rates so that they are digestible to the 
general public. Despite TILA, it is still possible to advertise rates that 
are accurate but misleading.68 Second, loan agreements and 
supporting documentation should not be so cumbersome that 
consumers do not take the time to read and understand them. 
Lenders should avoid fifty-page tomes for simple loans. Finally, any 
solution should build on the progress of laws like the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act that make it illegal to discriminate when issuing 
credit.69 It is becoming increasingly clear that any Madden fix will 
require a legislative solution. In order to adequately address the 
Madden court's concerns, lawmakers should take care to include 
consumer protection provisions in any proposed amendments to the 
charter system. 
CONCLUSION 
The Madden court aimed to restrict NBA protections to chartered 
institutions and advance consumer protection, but its decision 
resulted in decreased credit and lending opportunities within the 
circuit. Though Madden has been fairly criticized, prompting multiple 
attempts to reverse its impact, policymakers should not allow the 
decision’s unintended effects to obfuscate the court’s underlying 
 
 65. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Concerned About Widespread 
Servicing Failures Reported by Student Loan Borrowers (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-concerned-about-widespread-
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rationales. Proposed reform efforts must be holistic and should not 
only seek to promote credit access, but also consider Madden’s 
reasoning before proceeding. 
 
